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 Abstract 
This paper compares two models to explain the effects of party politics on Portuguese local 
government expenditures.  The demand model (in this case the mean voter) fails empirically in the 
fact that public expenditures are not responsive to the tax share price supported by the mean voter.  
This model assumes that party competition is implicitly reflected in the fact that parties must satisfy 
the preferences of public expenditures of the aggregate voters. If the model fails, so does the idea 
that policy is just a means to win elections and be in power.  The second model explicitly tests party 
effects and is adjusted to the specific features of the Portuguese local government structure, mainly 
its financial constraints on central grants and taxation.  Controlling for the needs and resources, the 
model supports a slight effect of a right-leaning ideology and a sympathetic central government 
(affinity between ruling party in local and the party central government).   
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Introduction 
The effects of political party behavior on the public policy of local 
governments has been the object of a significant amount of studies.  Among other 
effects, the ideological position (left-right) and competition are the features of parties 
that deserve the most attention in these studies.  Theoretically, these variables are 
assumed to influence the policies of local governments by affecting its output, which 
is measured by the total amount or by the per capita expenditures. 
These types of empirical studies have been based on different theoretical 
conceptualizations (mainly two), although all of them can be considered as public 
choice models of local government (Boyne, 1998).  On the one hand, there are the 
demand models, in which local expenditure in the community is the most preferred 
by the median (or the mean) voter.  Party competition leads parties to implement 
the preferred level of expenditure, as explained by the Downsian median voter 
theorem.  In these models, party effects are assumed to be inherent in the 
competition to assure the maximization of the number of voters.  Typically, 
economists are the producers of these models.  On the other hand, there are 
empirical studies that adjust to the particular characteristics of different local 
governments.  These models are ideological models, because they assume that 
parties are not only responsive to the preferences of electors.  They also have 
preferences over certain policies and try to adopt them.  I refer to them as ‘party 
effects models’ as opposed to demand models.  These studies first appeared in UK 
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local government because it is organized in a different way from local government in 
the US.  Political variables are explicitly included in models that specificly control for 
the particular needs and resources of each local government.  These two groups of 
models are rooted in distinct bases, but they share an important feature, that is, the 
role of party competition in affecting public policy.  Nevertheless, that role is very 
different. 
In this paper, I test these two alternative theoretical models in Portuguese 
local governments, a country where these kinds of studies are almost nonexistent.  
Portugal has a system of local government much more similar to the rest of the 
European countries, especially with respect to its fiscal dependence on central 
government.  This lack of financial autonomy challenges the demand models of 
local expenditures, because it strongly constrains the voters choice and the supply 
of really different alternatives by local governments.  In the next section, I 
summarize the most relevant literature about party effects on local government 
performance.  Demand models and party effects models are reviewed separately.  
In the section that follows, I describe the organization of Portuguese local 
government, which is the object of this study.  Forms of government, financial 
autonomy, and party politics are emphasized in that description.  Afterwards, I test 
the two main models used in the literature and I conclude that demand models fail 
empirically because they are not adequate to explain Portuguese local government 
expenditures.  Afterwards, I show that the output studies that explicitly account for 
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party effects and control needs and resources are much more adequate for this 
purpose. 
Political Competition, Party Effects, and Local Government 
Policy Variation 
There are two contrasting models on party influence on local public policy. 
On the one hand, there is the Downsian inspired models (Downs, 1957), which 
emphasize the role of party competition in the convergence of policy platforms in 
order to capture a pivotal - median or mean – voter (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979).  
The median voter theorem leads to the nonexistence of policy values other than that 
of winning elections.  On the other hand, the ideological model emphasizes that 
parties have preferred policies and that party competition is the means to gain votes 
(Wittman, 1973).  In this model, parties tend to be more unresponsive to the 
electorate because they are interested in their favored policy.  There is a place for 
party competition in both, however in different ways.  Regardless, both models have 
been widely used and tested to explain party politics. 
Demand Models of Political Competition  
The central hypothesis of the Downsian model is that “political parties in a 
democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes” (Downs, 1957: 
137). In this model, political parties are almost completely responsive to the 
preferences of voters, particularly the voter with the median income in the 
distribution of incomes. Political parties competing for votes seek the ideological 
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position that reflects the preferences of the median voter, thus maximizing votes. 
This consequence of the model is known as the median voter model (Mueller, 
1996). 
The model and the theorem have been the object of a significant amount of 
empirical tests, mainly at the local level of government.  Some authors, mainly 
economists, call this the “public choice approach” (Mueller, 1996).  Empirically, the 
model assumes that “public fiscal behavior is taken to reflect the wishes of the voter 
with the mean income” (Turnbull and Djoundourian, 1994: 223).  Two of the first 
very influential studies of this kind were conducted by Barr and Davis (1966) and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).  The latter, entitled “Private Demand for Public 
Goods” (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973) pose the question as the median voter 
demanding his/her preferred level of public expenditure. The typical demand 
equation for the median voter is (Mueller, 1996: 190): 
LnGm = b0 + b1 tm + b2 lnYm + b3 lnZ +um 
Because it is a typical demand model, the crucial variables are the price and 
the income of the consumer.  In this equation, G is the level of government 
expenditures, that is, the good (public) to be demanded by the median voter.  The 
price of the good is tm, measured as the price of the tax share of the median income 
voter. Ym is the median income of the voter in the community.  Finally, Z is a vector 
of socioeconomic variables reflecting the tastes of the voter. 
The Downsian demand model has restrictions at the theoretical and empirical 
level.  The theoretical limitation is that the model in its original version (Hotelling, 
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1929) and in Downs’ (1957) version applies to two-party competition.  Thus, we 
expect to have better results in local governments with two-party competition.  The 
empirical limitations have much to do with this.  Too many times, the model has 
been tested without proposing an alternative model (Farnham, 1986, 1987, 1990).  
When it is proposed, the alternative is almost always the mean voter, rather than 
the median voter (Pommerehne, 1978; Boyne, 1987; Turnbull and Djoundourian, 
1994).  When using the mean voter, the result is that “policies reflect the aggregate 
demand” (Boyne, 1987: 203) of the electorate.  Empirically, the mean voter is very 
analogous to the median voter.  The difference resides in the fact that in the 
regression equations, average values are used instead of median voter values. The 
empirical tests of the median voter model against mean voter have not shown the 
first to be consistently better (Pommerehne, 1978; Boyne, 1987; Turnbull and 
Djoundourian, 1994).  Boyne concludes that “the evidence provides little support for 
the median voter hypothesis” (1987: 201).  
With respect to the characteristics of the political system in the community, 
the median voter has not been shown to be consistently better.  Boyne concludes 
that in the metropolitan communities of England, “there is no evidence that two-
party systems facilitate the impact of median voter interests on tax policies” (Boyne, 
1987: 213).  In non-metropolitan local governments, “the mean voter is superior in 
single and multi-party systems; but the median voter model provides better results 
than the mean voter in two-party systems” (ib.).  Thus, the median voter is only 
better, if it is better, in two-party systems.   
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Another characteristic of the political system tested in these kinds of models 
is the comparison of direct vs. representative democracies.  In a study about Swiss 
municipalities, Pommerehne (1978) found that in direct democracy systems, the 
median voter model is better than the mean voter model.  But in representative 
democracies, the median model is not significantly better. 
Therefore, the empirical tests of the median voter model have shown it to be 
better only in two-party systems and direct democracies.  Portuguese local 
government are multi-party systems with representative democracy. Thus, this 
means that it is not worse to use the mean voter model to test the demand model of 
local expenditures. 
Ideological Model  
According to the ideological model of political competition in local 
government, political parties have preferences over policies that they try to 
maximize.  The central hypothesis is “that political parties are solely interested in 
policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end” (Wittman, 1973: 
490). It is easy to see that their model is the complete opposite of the Downsian 
model.  In the Downsian model, elections are a mechanism the public has to 
choose leaders, where in the ideological model, elections are a mechanism to 
choose among different policies (Boyne, 1998).  While in the Downsian model policy 
is the means to win elections and to have power, in the ideological model it is 
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precisely the opposite. Thus, the role of competition is different and so is the 
influence of party effects. 
I show the mode in which the Downsian model has been deductively 
elaborated in the demand and rational voter model.  This model leads to empirically 
testable hypothesis, in this case, the equation of demand of public goods 
(expenditures).  In contrast, there is no similar formal deduction of the ideological 
model.  Nevertheless, it is argued that “any models should be devised from 
substantive knowledge of the policy [political system] area under consideration” 
(Boyne, 1985: 508).  One of those substantive issues that must be considered is the 
autonomy of local governments to implement their most preferred policies.  Without 
autonomy, it is not relevant to talk about the ideological model. 
Despite the nonexistence of a standard universal model, almost all of the 
empirical tests use local expenditures, either the total or per capita amount, as the 
dependent variable (local public policy).  This is the reason why this type of studies 
is called “output studies” by some authors (Boyne, 1985).  Broadly speaking, one 
can assume two main groups of influences on local public policies.  The first effects 
are the party variables that one can test (party effects).  The second effects are the 
environmental variables that characterize the particular situation under analysis.  In 
this sense, the general model of empirical output studies is: 
 
  
 
 Environment
 Public PolicyPolitical System 8
Usually, the environmental variables are referred to as the needs of the local 
community for a particular level of spending and the resources available to meet 
such needs (Boyne, 1990, 1996, 1998; Page et al. 1990).  Page et al. (1990) use 
some needs variables, such as the age structure of the population, social class 
composition of the population, and population change.  Nevertheless, there is a 
“huge variety of possibilities” (ibidem: 51).  The resources variables are almost 
always diverse forms of local taxes (mostly property taxes) and central grants.  In 
Portugal, central grants are many times designed to equally distribute resources in 
the country.  This means that grants are also an indicator (although indirect) of the 
local needs. 
 
Portuguese Local Government Structure, Finance, and 
Political Parties 
In Portugal, the most important institution of local government is the 
municipality (‘municipio’)1.  Each municipality has authority over an area called a 
county (‘concelho’).  All the counties cover all the territory.  In this sense, each 
municipality is very similar to American countries.  There is no local government 
structure similar to either American cities, towns or townships, or districts.  Each 
                                            
1 There are 275 municipalities in ‘Continental Portugal’, 19 in Azores Islands, and 11 in 
Madeira Islands.  Continental Portugal is the territory part of the country that belongs to what is 
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county is also divided into a number of parishes (‘freguesias’), which is a level of 
local government within the municipality.  However, parishes are very small (around 
4,000 in number) and do not have financial and administrative resources that are 
relevant to the description of the true local government.  Moreover, there is no 
regional level of government.  Therefore, the municipality is the only important form 
local government. 
The existence of municipalities is a constitutional statement, thus means that 
they are central government creatures.  The central government also approves 
legislation on general guidelines concerning attributions of the local institution.  This 
means that all municipalities have the same general limits on their political and 
policy activity. 
The form of government defined by central government is also the same in 
all the municipalities.  There is an executive body (‘camara municipal’) with 5,7,9, or 
11 members2 according to the size of the municipality.  There is multi-party 
proportional election system for this body.  The body itself elects its president 
(camara’s president) which is can be seen as a strong mayor.  It is important to 
stress that the camara may or may not have a majority of one party.  Since the 
decisions are dichotomous, if a party (the party of the president) has the majority, it 
                                                                                                                                      
known as Continental Europe, without the Islands.  Portugal includes two sets of islands (Azores and 
Madeira) in the Atlantic Ocean. 
2 Because they are larger than the others, Lisbon and Porto have 17 and 15 members in the 
camara municipal, respectively. 
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can govern by implementing its own policies.  If there is no majority, the president’s 
party needs to gain support from minority parties, so the probability of more 
discussion and bargaining is much higher. 
The second governing body in municipality is the legislative body 
(‘assembleia municipal’), whose importance is overshadowed by the executive 
body.  Although there are separate elections for the legislative body, the 
‘assembleia’ tends to reflect the same issue positions as the executive bodies.  
Thus, they tend to approve the issues that the executive hands them. 
With regards to local party politics there are some important issues to note.  
In first place, there are four main parties, represented at the national and local level. 
Following the Left-Right ideological spectrum, they are the following: 
• Extreme Left -- PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) 
• Left – PS (Socialist Party) 
• Right – PSD (Social Democratic Party) 
• Extreme Right – CDS (Democratic Social Center) 
The two middle parties are the biggest ones, which gain about 80-85% of the votes 
and they account for at least two thirds of the camara’s presidents.  Typically, two or 
three parties are represented in the executive body of 5 to 9 members.  This means 
that the political party competition at local level can vary significantly.   
The financial resources of municipalities are composed by central (lump 
sum) grants.  They account for a minimum of 50% and the maximum of 65% of the 
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revenues3. The other resources are mainly local taxes, but these are very limited.  
This financial structure a of strong limitation of municipalities’ autonomy in public 
policy flexibility (Pereira, 1991).  This is, in my opinion, the most important reason 
why demand models are not adequate to explain Portuguese local government 
policy.  They fail the empirical test presented, as the next section clearly suggests.   
 
Party Effects on Portuguese Local Governments 
In this part, l develop a specific model to test the effects of party politics on 
the public policies of Portuguese municipalities.  In a model that considers party 
effects, consistent with the ideological model explained above, policy-makers have 
desired policies that result from their ideology, party competition, structure of the 
political system, etc.  Assuming that this is relevant, as the literature suggests 
(Boyne, 1996, 1998: Page et al., 1990; Bosh and Suarez-Pandiello, 1995), my basic 
assumption is that the effects do exist.   
Assumption 
Party politics have effects on global local public policies, as 
measured by expenditures. 
 
                                            
3 These grants, called FEF (Financial Equilibrium Fund) are designed to attenuate the 
disequilibria among municipalities.  For these reasons, it is a very strong indicator of the needs of 
each municipality. 
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Given this assumption, the important question becomes: What effects exist 
and how should we test them?  One of the political questions most often studied 
empirically, for which evidence is found, is the idea that liberal or left-leaning policy-
makers tend to prefer more social and welfare spending.  This is the ideological 
effect, in which right-leaning governments tend to spend less on average (Boyne, 
1998; Bosh and Suarez-Pandiello, 1995).  Thus, my first testable hypothesis on 
party effects is based on the literature and assumes the relevance of ideology in the 
level of public expenditures.  
Testable Hypothesis 1: 
Right-leaning parties tend to spend less than leftist ones. 
 
The second important issue is that in a multi-party system, the competition 
among local parties can be higher or lower, and this can have important policy 
consequences.  A party with a majority in the council has the conditions to dominate 
it, and, in this way, has strong governing power.  In the absence of a majority, that 
is, when the level of competition is great, “political negotiation, interchange of votes 
or ‘logrolling’ positively affects the growth of public expenditure” (Bosh and Suarez-
Pandiello, 1995: 41).  My second hypothesis also follows from the literature (Boyne 
1996, 1998). 
Testable Hypothesis 2: 
A higher level of competition implies more bargaining among 
parties, thereby implying more spending. 
 
 13
Another issue in Portuguese local government is to know whether the ruling 
pary (the party of the president) have some benefit from a sympathetic national 
government.  By this, I mean the case where the party in the central government 
coincides with the ruling party in the local government.  This argument is many 
times used in Portuguese political activity.  Therefore, I test a third hypothesis: 
Testable Hypothesis 3: 
A sympathetic national government creates conditions for 
more resources and, therefore, local governments tend to 
spend more. 
 
These three hypotheses are tested in a cross-sectional regression model 
similar to the output studies in the literature.  The dependent variable is local 
expenditures per capita, Exppc.  Local expenditures is the most widely used 
indicator of public policy behavior of governments.  
The key independent variables are three, one for each of the relations I 
hypothesized.  The first is Right, is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for 
the parties on the Right and 0 for those on the Left.  The expected sign is negative 
because right-leaning parties are expected to spend less (Hypothesis 1).  The 
second variable is Compet. This variable is an indicator of competition in each 
locality.  Among the many possible variables used in the literature, I measure 
competition as the ratio, council seats / seats of the first party.  This indicator is 
higher the greater the competition.  If the ruling party is very strong, the indicator is 
close to 1.  When this indicator has the value of 2, it represents the threshold of 
having or not a majority in the council.  The expected sign is positive, according to 
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Hypothesis 2.  The third variable is Central, another dummy that takes the value 1 if 
the ruling party is the same as the party in national government.  According to 
Hypothesis 3, I expect a positive sign. 
The model must also control for the needs and resources of the community, 
so that the local government may pursue its policy options.  As in other European 
local government systems, the Portuguese system is very dependent on the central 
grants.  Thus, this is the most important resource variable.  The second source of 
resources in Portugal is local direct taxes.  The needs are represented by a set of 
four socioeconomic variables.  Certainly, the most important function of the 
Portuguese local government is public housing, planning, and infrastructure 
projects.  Because of this, the first needs variable is the urbanization rate. The other 
three are the unemployment rate, the elementary school population, and the 
proportion of people aged under 25 and more than 64 (Page et al., 1990).  The 
following table summarizes all the independent variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Functionally, the model is defined in per capita values, as is usual in this type 
of studies: 
Party Effects Model Equation  
Exppci = β0 + β1 Righti+ β2 Centrali+ β3 Competi + β4 Grantpci +β5 Taxpci +     
β6 Urbanri +β7 Unempri +β8 Elementi +β9 Demogi + εi 
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Table 2 – Independent Variables 
Variable Description Expected Sign 
Right Dummy variable, coded 1 if right ruling party 
and 0 if otherwise 
Negative 
Compet Indicator of competition measured as the  
No of seats Council / No of seats larger party 
Positive 
Central Dummy variable, coded 1 if same party as 
the party in central government and 0 if 
otherwise 
Positive 
Grantspc Central grants measured in thousands of  
escudos 
Positive 
Taxpc Direct taxes in the community measured in 
thousands of escudos 
Positive 
Urbanr Urbanization rate measured as a percentage Negative 
Unempr Unemployment rate measured as a 
percentage 
Negative 
Element The number of persons with elementary 
school  
Positive 
Demog The number of persons aged under 25 and 
more than 64  
Uncertain 
 
 
 16
The criteria for supporting the party effects on local policy expenditures 
should be the standard criteria, which implies two things: statistical significance and 
the right sign.  Table 3 reports the results. 
 
Table 3 – Party Effects Model 
Estimates by OLS (robust White standard errors) 
  
Constant 0.8290E-02 
           (1.21889) 
Right - 0.88433E-02** 
         (-3.22969) 
Central 0.64550E-02** 
        (2.55878) 
Compet - 0.76800E-03 
          (-.29357) 
Grantpc 1.64095** 
         (16.4006) 
Taxpc 2.35762** 
         (10.4386) 
Urbanr 0.9800E-04* 
         (1.92973) 
Unempr - 0.1113E-02** 
       (-2.73141) 
Element 0.2308E-06** 
        (2.1298) 
Demog - 0.3301E-06** 
         (-3.5458) 
  
R2 0.788848 
Adjusted R2 0.781677 
Se 0.01708 
NOTE: 
• Estimators are heteroscedastic consistent; 
• The values in parentesis are t-statistics. 
• * statistically significant for one-tail test. 
• ** statistically significant for two-tail test.   
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Data 
The data set I use is drawn from the 275 municipalities in Continental 
Portugal4.  The data pertain to the year 1993, which is the last year available for the 
information required.  All of the variables concerning local government were 
obtained from the book, Administração Local em Números.  These variables are: 
expenditures, FEF (central grants), number of electors, direct taxes, and some 
dichotomous variables.  The variable income was obtained from Data Bank of 
Ministry of Qualification and Employment.  The population, unemployment rate, and 
the educational and demographic variables were taken from Portuguese Census 
19915. Population density is from the Markest Sales Index (1994).  
VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV 
logExpi = β0 + β1 loginci+ β2 logtaxpri+ β3 logpopi + Σ δi Si + εi 
This is the widely used demand  model of local expenditures (log-linear or 
constant elasticity).  Like all other demand models of public goods, the dependent 
variable (logExp) is the total expenditure of local government i in year of analysis, 
1993.  Loginc is the log of the average income of the mean voter in the municipality 
i.  Because this variable represents the income elasticity, I theoretically expect β1 > 
0.  Logtaxpr is the log of the tax price share of the mean voter.  Like Boyne (1987), 
                                            
4 I exclude the 30 municipalities of the Azores and Madeira Islands.  
5 The reason for using the 1991 data is because it is the most recent available information. 
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I compute this variable as the ratio of direct taxes to the number of voters.  This 
reflects the mean voter elasticity price.  Obviously, in a demand model, the price 
varies inversely to the quantity demanded.  Therefore, I expect a negative sign, that 
is, β2  < 0.  Logpop is the log of the population and its inclusion is merely to control 
for the population.  β3 is expected to be positive. 
In order to account for the tastes of the population among the municipalities, I 
add a vector δ.Si of socio-economic variables.  This specification first appeared in 
the literature of local government expenditures with Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973).  I include four: the amount of people unemployed, the number of persons 
with a high school degree, persons aged 19 and younger and 64 and older, and, 
finally, the population density.6  
The variation in the dimension of the Portuguese municipalities is high, which 
leads one to suspect the existence of heteroscedasticity.  Because of this, I perform 
a White test. The results strongly favor the rejection of homoscedastic errors.  As 
recommended, I estimate the models using the White standard errors or robust 
standard errors.  The results of the regressions are shown in Table 1. 
MMMMMMMM 
                                            
6 Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) include seven variables: population change, employment 
residential ratio, percentage owner occupied, percentage of nonwhite, density, percentage 
population with age more than 65, and percentage living in the same house.  
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The following model tests the political party influence on local expenditures, 
and is based on the theoretical framework of Farnham (1987, 1990).  
Equation 1 
logExp = β0 + β1 loginci+ β2 logtaxpri+ β3 logpopi + β4 centrali +β5 righti +      
β6 majori + Σ δi Si + εi 
This is the largely used demand (log-linear or constant elasticity) model of 
local expenditures.  Loginc is the log of the average income of the mean voter in a 
municipality.  Because this variable represents the income elasticity, theoretically I 
expect β1 > 0.  Logtaxpr is the log of tax price share of the mean voter.  Like Boyne 
(1987), I compute this variable as the ratio of direct taxes to the number of voters.  
This reflects the mean voter elasticity price, therefore I expect a negative sign, β2  < 
0.  Logpop is the log of the population and its inclusion is self evident.  That is, 
without people there would no justification for expenditures, so β3 is expected to be 
positive. 
The first of the political party influence variables, Central, is a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the president’s party of the municipality is the same as the 
party in office in the central government.  Because an important proportion of 
revenues of local governments originates from central grants, I hypothesize that this 
leads to greater expenditures -- β4 > 0.  Another dummy variable is Right, which 
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takes the value of 1 if the governing party has a right-leaning ideology7.  I test the 
hypothesis, associated with the conservative ideas regarding budget equilibrium, 
that the rightist parties tend to have less expenditures than leftist parties.  These 
latter parties are usually more sensitive to social and welfare policies, therefore I 
expect β5 to have a negative effect.  The third party influence that I test is Major, a 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the local government is composed of a 
majority of single party (the president’s party).  The reason is that in these cases, 
the major party can govern alone without bargaining about budget or other policies.  
This is the hypothesis widely accepted in public choice theory, which asserts that 
wherever bargaining and commitments are needed expenditures will grow.  So, I 
expect β6 > 0. 
In order to reflect the tastes of population among municipalities, I add a 
vector δ S of socio-economic variables.  This specification appeared for the first 
time in the literature of local government expenditures with Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973).  It includes seven variables.  However, I include only four: the 
amount of people unemployed, the number of persons with high school degree, 
persons aged 19 and d younger and 64 and older, and, finally, the population 
density.  
                                            
7 In Portugal this is easy to see. There are four important parties, two right and two left 
parties. The others has no aspirations to win seats.  
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Equation 2 
logExp = β0 + β1 loginci+ β2 logtaxpri+ β3 logpopi + Σ δi Si + εi 
The second equation is standard in this kind of model, since Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973).  The idea is to test the influence of the presence political party 
variables. 
Equation 3 
logExp = β0 + β1 loginci+ β2 logtaxpri+ β3 logpopi + β3 centrali +β5 righti +      
β6 majori + εi 
This equation is similar to equation 1 without the socio-economic vector.  Again, I 
intend to test for changes in the coefficient of the variables. 
Equation 4 
logExp = β0 + β1 loginci+ β2 logtaxpri+ β3 logpopi + β4 centrali +β5 righti +      
β6 majori + Σ δi Si + β7 grnshi + εi 
Equation 4 follows the model of Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994), which 
includes the average share of central grants grnshi.  Like the authors, I compute 
this variable as central grants divided by the number of electors.  
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III - Empirical Results and Discussion 
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Estimates by OLS (White standard errors robust) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Constant 0.239 
    (0.276) 
0.34 
    (0.399) 
0.178 
    (0.214) 
0.131 
    (0.179) 
Loginc 0.441 
    (3.25)** 
0.419 
    (3.161)** 
0.465 
    (3.359)** 
0.409 
    (3.531)**
Logtaxpr 0.236 
    (6.709)** 
0.233 
    (6.579)** 
0.222 
    (6.64)** 
0.251 
    (8.341)**
Logpop 0.621 
    (2.376)* 
0.669 
    (2.579) 
0.603 
    (25.013)** 
1.00 
    (4.718)**
Central 0.174 
    (2.924)** 
 0.208 
    (4.387)** 
0.191 
    (4.404)**
Right -0.165 
    (-2.666)** 
 - 0.209 
    (- 4.612)** 
-0.196 
    (- 4.10)**
Major 0.076 
    (1.974)* 
 0.072 
    (1.811) 
0.047 
    (1.48) 
Logpden 0.104 
    (- 4.278)** 
-0.111 
    (- 4.858)** 
 0.012 
    (0.449) 
Logdem 0.013 
    (0.057) 
-0.034 
    (- 0.144) 
 -0.099 
    (- 0.535) 
Logun -0.083 
    (- 2.351)* 
-0.073 
    (- 2.155)* 
 -0.082 
    (-2.491)* 
Logsch 0.121 
    (2.442)* 
0.114 
    (2.321)* 
 0.133 
    (3.115)**
Grntsh    0.865 
    (6.972)**
R2 0.8938 0.8904 0.8814 0.9203 
Adjusted R2 0.8898 0.8875 0.8787 0.9169 
Stand Error Reg 0.267 0.300 0.27 0.232 
F (zero slopes) 222.244 309.879 331.897 275.980 
White het. Test 128.028 108.289 62.175 175.088 
NOTE: 
• Estimators are heteroscedastic consistent; 
• The values in parentesis are t-statistics. 
* statistically significant at 90% significance level;  ** at 95%.  
In general, all regressions have quite similar results, but the first one reveals 
more efficient coefficients.  These are almost always statistically significant, but with 
elasticities less than one in absolute value.  
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The political party influence variables are significant, showing the expected 
signs, however, the magnitude of the influence on local expenditures is low.  The 
coincidence of the local government president’s party with central government party 
tends to increase the expenditures from about 0.17% to 0.20%.  Having a right-
leaning ideology is also significant, with a decreasing effect on the expenditures, 
although the result shown an inelastic magnitude.  The relevance of having a 
majority in the local government is very weak.  The coefficients are very low and 
only in the first equation are they significant at 90%.  In the fourth equation, the 
elasticity of the shares of the central grants is tested.  The significant coefficient is, 
as with all the others, inelastic. However, it has a higher intensity than the others, 
which means that local expenditures tend to increase in almost the same proportion 
as per capita central grants. 
With regard to the classical variables, present in all equations, the results 
show that local expenditures are income and price inelastic, with significant 
coefficients.  This is consistent with previous empirical results in which “the demand 
for state-local government services is, in most cases, price and income inelastic” 
(Fisher, 1996: 95).  Income elasticity is around 0.40 and 0.47, which is a value 
similar to the results found in most studies (Farnham, 1990; Turnbull and 
Djoundourian, 1994). 
The surprising finding has to do with the sign of the price elasticity coefficient.  
All previous studies generate a negative sign, in consonance with the assumption of 
local services as ordinary public goods.  However, my results always show a 
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statistically significant positive relationship between price and local expenditures.  
The elasticities remain constant in the four equations, ranging from 0.22 to 0.25. 
Globally, all of the regressions have a good fit, an adjusted R2 of about 88% 
and 91%, which is higher than previous results.  The regressions are statistically 
significant, as the F-statistics show. 
Discussion  
Overall, the party effects (ideological) model shows better statistical results 
than the mean voter demand model and, more important, is theoretically more 
consistent.  
Statistically, the model obtains a very good fit, 78% of the variation of local 
expenditures per capita is explained by the model.  The coefficient of the Right 
variable is significant and has the expected sign, which means that, on average, 
right-leaning parties tend to spend less.  Thus, this is in consonance with 
Hypothesis 1 and also with the results usuallyfound in the literature (Boyne, 1998).  
The coefficient of the Cent variable is also significant and has the expected sign, 
which means that governing party in the municipality with a sympathetic central 
government tends to spend more.  In both cases, the coefficients are small in 
magnitude, which is not surprising because the model works with expenditures per 
capita.  The third key variable concerning party effects, Compet, has an 
insignificant coefficient, meaning that as far as I can tell, there is no effect of the 
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level of competition on public policy; this result is also similar to those found in the 
existing studies. 
With respect to the control variables, needs and resources, they are 
generally significant.  The variables concerning the resources of the local 
government (central grants and local taxes) are very significant and have the 
expected positive sign.  Obviously, this is not surprising because local governments 
are very dependent on the resource constraints, mainly on the central grants.  Local 
governments in Portugal are strongly responsive to the resources available but not 
to the preferences of the mean or median voter.  “Taxes represent the extractive 
capacity of government rather than a cost mechanism” (Schneider, 1989: 55-56). 
The same of line of reason is applied to central grants. This point is the most crucial 
difference between the two models tested here.  The wrong sign on the price-share 
coefficient, seen in the mean voter demand model, means that the Portuguese 
public expenditures level is not like a cost mechanism. The extractive capacity of 
local governments and its financial constraints are strongly reflected in the highly 
significant and potent resources coefficient. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper compares two models that explain the effects of party politics on 
local government public expenditures, the mean voter demand model and the party 
effects (ideological model).  Specifically, these two models are applied to 
Portuguese case.  The standard mean voter demand model, inspired in public 
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choice theory, empirically fails in the fact that public expenditures are not 
responsive to the tax share price supported by the mean voter.  This model 
assumes that party competition is implicitly reflected in the fact that parties must 
satisfy the voter’s preferences of public expenditures of the reference voter.  
Because the model fails, so does the Downsian idea that policy is just a means to 
win elections and stay in power. 
The second model, contrary to the first, explicitly tests party effects and is 
adjusted to the specific features of the Portuguese local government structure, 
mainly its financial constraints on central grants and taxation. Controlling for the 
needs and resources of Portuguese communities, the model provides a support for 
a slight effect of a right-leaning ideology and also of a sympathetic national 
government.  No less important, the dependence on local resources is strongly 
supported. 
The specific model of Portuguese local government can be improved in 
different ways. The first is to analyze the different patterns of party effects in 
different arenas of public policy. The classification among redistributive, 
developmental, and allocative arenas can be starting point Peterson (1981).  A 
second possible improvement is to analyze the issue of party competition in a more 
sophisticated model.  There are models that distinguish between additive (the only 
effects considered here) and mediative effects (Boyne, 1996, 1998).  The third way 
is to test the issue of volatility of party dominance, which implies the use of time-
series data on elections and expenditures.  Portuguese local governments are still a 
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rich ground for empirical research that can be further explored carefully.  This paper 
is, therefore, a starting point.  
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